will be killed or wounded in the process. Hypothetically, a lighter intervening forcethat is, one without armored vehicles, helicopters, and artillery-might deploy three times as fast and save 10,000 more lives, but at the cost of 50 more intervener casualties. Would such a trade-off be worthwhile? Who should decide? MARO does not answer such questions or even explore them in detail, but deserves credit for acknowledging them rather than pretending, as have many previous analyses, that all such challenges can be overcome by political will.
MARO also astutely recommends advance planning for specific military interventions. Very few countries actually are at risk of genocidal violence, and experts are generally able to identify them. 6 If military planning teams were provided several months to research past patterns of violence and current political trends in these states, they would be able to pinpoint the most likely perpetrators and targets of atrocities, the locations and means of entry for interveners, the potential staging bases in neighboring states, and the best strategies to stanch violence. Such advance planning would make intervention much faster and more effective when and if deployment orders ever came, potentially saving tens or even hundreds of thousands more lives in a case such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
Full-blown intervention is not the only type that can prevent atrocities, as the report accurately observes, because smaller-scale deterrent operations also can decisively affect outcomes (65-69). An excellent example, not cited in MARO, took place in Liberia in 2003. The mere deployment of US Marines off the coastaccompanied by military over-flights, deft diplomacy, a regional peacekeeping contingent, and a small evacuation force-successfully persuaded President Charles Taylor to leave office, thereby ending a savage civil war and alleviating a humanitarian emergency for tens of thousands of displaced civilians. 7 Despite these many attributes, MARO is marred by two shortcomings. First, it focuses mainly on military operations to the relative neglect of political strategies and consequences. Second, it often relies on a simplistic, idealized conflict scenario, giving rise to intervention proposals that could backfire in more realistic and complex settings. Although MARO refers in passing to ''second-order'' (40; 52; 68) and ''third-order'' (27; 40) effects of military intervention, 8 it largely ignores the implications of such ''system effects,'' which, as Robert Jervis has noted, can radically alter policy prescriptions. 9 The report explicitly avoids complex policy questions about intervention, stating that ''The MARO Project itself is concerned with answering the 'how,' not the 'whether' '' (13) . Unfortunately, since military intervention can unintentionally increase the likelihood of atrocities, the ''how'' of intervention is inextricably linked to debates about ''whether'' such action is advisable.
Strategy versus Operations
The Prussian military officer Carl von Clausewitz famously noted that war is ''a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.'' 10 While this dictum is well known, its policy implications are less widely understood. Clausewitz was criticizing the tendency-still prevalent today-of war planning to focus more on military operations than on the achievement of underlying political objectives. Essentially, he warned against winning the battle while losing the war. Or, as he summed it up, military ''means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. '' 11 Modern scholars and practitioners of military arts have institutionalized this lesson via an analytical prism comprising three levels of analysis that represent progressively wider scope: tactics, operations, and strategy. Tactics refer to the ways in which force is utilized locally to achieve small-scale military objectives. Operations refer to the ways in which tactics are utilized on a wider scale to achieve broader military objectives. Strategy refers to the ways in which military operations are utilized to achieve political objectives.
MARO, as its title indicates, focuses on military operations. This is necessary, but not sufficient. Since the advent of widespread humanitarian military intervention in the 1990s, such operations have frequently backfired strategically, by increasing civilian suffering, contrary to their political objective. From a Clausewitzian perspective, interveners often win the battle but lose the war. For example, in 1999, NATO bombing accomplished its military objective by compelling the retreat of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. But it failed strategically by unintentionally amplifying the killing and expulsion of ethnic Albanian civilians-five-fold, at minimum-and then enabling the revenge killing and expulsion of ethnic Serb civilians. 12 This outcome was precisely opposite to NATO's stated humanitarian objective of protecting civilians.
The only way to avert such perverse outcomes is to design military operations with an eye to strategy based on realistic scenarios that draw upon accurate descriptions of past interventions. Unfortunately, here too MARO sometimes falls short.
White and Black Hats
The greatest flaw of MARO is that it assumes that most atrocities are committed in the context of one-way violence by a state against its civilians. The report thus views intervention as having the straightforward effect of stopping the bad guys and protecting the good guys, with assistance from non-governmental and multilateral organizations. 13 As it summarizes, ''The four categories [of actors] include: perpetrators, victims, interveners, and a more nebulous group of 'others' '' (44).
In reality, as scholars have long documented but only recently emphasized, most atrocities by states are committed in response to rebel challenges, including armed secession. States typically target civilians who are suspected of supporting, harboring, or secretly being rebels. From 1943 to 1987, Harff and Gurr identified 44 episodes of ''genocide and politicide,'' state-sponsored campaigns lasting at least six months that deliberately killed thousands of noncombatants. 14 In 30 of those 44 cases (68%), as I observed in a 2005 analysis, rebels provoked the state's retaliation against civilians. 15 In a separate study, Helen Fein identified 19 cases of genocide from 1945 to 1988. She similarly concluded that ''one could classify at least 11 cases [58%] as retributive genocide in which the perpetrators retaliated to a real or perceived threat by the victim to the structure of domination.'' 16 In a more recent quantitative analysis, Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay likewise find that atrocities are best explained as a state strategy to ''drain the sea'' of rebels. 17 Because of these complex dynamics, international efforts to protect at-risk civilians, as called for by the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect, can perversely backfire by exacerbating violence. This is so because intervention to defend targeted civilians, whether through military or diplomatic action, often has the effect of also protecting and assisting rebels. This emboldens the rebels to escalate their attacks against the state, provoking still greater atrocities. In some cases, rebels even deliberately provoke state retaliation against civilians to attract international intervention. Over the last two decades, this moral-hazard dynamic has exacerbated atrocities in three of the worst cases: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur. 18 A pre-publication draft of MARO failed almost entirely to contemplate this dynamic. Only one sentence in an appendix noted that international deterrent operations ''may inspire opposition groups to increase any activities that may have been contributing to the situation and prompt a harsh governmental response.'' Following comments from me (and perhaps others), MARO moved that sentence into the main text and added that opposition groups may try to ''manipulate an intervention by external parties'' (68). The final report also warns that ''rebel groups may conduct mass atrocities to intimidate populations, undermine the government's legitimacy, or provoke the government into a disproportionate response'' (45). These are important correctives. But MARO still fails to address the implications for strategy, because it focuses nearly exclusively on military operations. 19 As a result, the report prescribes military action that could mitigate some atrocities but might exacerbate others, thereby potentially increasing the total violence against civilians, constituting strategic failure.
The report's simple scenario of good versus bad guys also distorts lessons from the past. In Rwanda, for example, MARO explains the victimization of both of the country's main ethnic groups as follows: ''Rwandan [Hutu] genocidaires killed moderate Hutu in addition to Tutsi'' (39). This ignores long-standing evidence that the invading Tutsi rebels, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, themselves killed tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu civilians before, during, and after the genocide, thereby helping provoke and fuel the massacres by Hutu extremists. 20 Ironically, the report cites only the Hutu for using media ''to attempt to control, or decisively shape, the information environment'' (55). In actuality, worldwide media reported Hutu crimes within weeks but failed to report Tutsi crimes for nearly 15 years because the propaganda of the rebels successfully blamed the Hutu for all atrocities and impeded UN investigations. MARO, in this instance, falls victim to precisely the kind of information operations that it warns against.
The history of rebel provocation also calls into question the report's policy prescriptions. For example, MARO insists repeatedly that increased international ''witness'' and ''transparency'' of atrocities, through better surveillance and reporting, would deter perpetrators (35-36). That is possible. But the literature on moral hazard reveals that sub-state actors sometimes rebel precisely because they expect media reports of the state's retaliation to compel intervention on their behalf. If so, greater reporting of state atrocities would actually increase the incentive for rebel provocations. It remains unclear, therefore, whether heightened ''witness'' of atrocities would increase or decrease such violence.
Finally, MARO's prescriptions ignore a broad body of literature illustrating how even purely humanitarian aid, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical care, may exacerbate conflict. 21 For example, militants often intermingle with civilians in refugee camps, so the aid may sustain the rebels and inhibit their reintegration into society, thereby prolonging fighting. Combatants sometimes intercept aid and resell it or charge a tax for its safe delivery, helping to fund war. In some cases, factions even fight each other to control delivery of aid, creating an extra incentive for violence. Humanitarian aid also may damage the local economy by under-pricing nearby merchants and producers, and it can delegitimate local political authorities by providing better services than the government. In addition, aid organizations often hire away the best-skilled local residents to serve as translators, drivers, or office staff, draining the human capital necessary for entrepreneurship and good governance. Unless such historical lessons are incorporated into military doctrine, future interventions are likely to repeat the mistakes of the past.
Military Doctrine Is Not Enough
The noble objective of reducing mass atrocities requires a multi-pronged strategy. First, the international community should pursue preventive rather than pyromaniac diplomacy. As noted above, states are most likely to perpetrate atrocities when confronted with violent domestic threats to their rule. Thus, diplomacy should emphasize consensual mediation, and carrots rather than sticks, to facilitate negotiated outcomes. By contrast, coercing a state to hand over power or territory to a domestic challenger is extremely dangerous because it heightens the risk that the state will resort to atrocities to retain control. 22 Diplomats should avoid such muscular mediation unless they also take steps to avert the likely backlash-for example, by providing soft landings for senior officials of the departing regime, or by pre-deploying a robust peacekeeping force. 23 Second, the United States and its allies should adopt criteria for intervention that minimize moral hazard. 24 Most importantly, they should refrain from helping rebels on humanitarian grounds unless state retaliation is grossly disproportionate, in order to provide both sides with an incentive to reduce violence. Interveners should also deliver humanitarian aid in ways that minimize its benefit to rebels, by guarding the supply routes and camps where assistance is provided to threatened populations.
Third, the United States should structure and base its military forces in ways that facilitate rapid reaction, because speed saves lives. Several ''ultra-light'' brigades should be designed and equipped so that they can deploy and operate without significant armor or heavy weapons in relatively permissive threat environments. To further reduce deployment time, some units or at least their equipment should be pre-positioned at bases in Africa, where mass atrocities are most likely to occur.
Finally, as MARO proposes, the United States and other like-minded states should adopt military doctrine to stop atrocities. Yet, even here, caution is required. Such routinization of intervention by itself could do more harm than good by further emboldening rebels to provoke state retaliation in expectation of the benefits from the humanitarian response. Only if properly embedded in a comprehensive strategyincluding enlightened diplomacy, strict intervention criteria, and well-designed forces-would MARO's proposed doctrine contribute unambiguously to the protection of at-risk civilians and thereby help implement the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect. 
